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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELDON E. RASMUSSEN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. V Case No. 
8081 
UNITED STATES STEEL COM-
PANY, a Corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondent has no serious dispute with the 
statement of the case as made by Appellant, however 
there are a few statements which should be clarified. 
The introductory statement asserts that the claim of the 
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Respondent was for an amount over and above the com-
pensation established by an express contract. There is 
no mention in the record which the Respondent can find 
wherein there was ever any reference or discussion of an 
express contract. It is assumed that at the time of initial 
employment there was an agreed rate of compensation, 
after which periodic raises were paid to Respondent, 
There was no mention or reference to any specfic dis-
cussions concerning the rate of pay after the initial 
employment. The Respondent is not therefore attempting 
to recover in the face of an express contract agreed upon 
by the parties fixing the rate of pay; but rather, it is the 
Respondent's contention that there was only one contract 
and that was an implied in fact contract to the effect that 
the Respondent would receive, in addition to the amount 
currently paid, retroactive payments to be determined 
after the completion of the job reevaluation study herein-
after mentioned. 
The first paragraph at top of Page 2 of the Appel-
lant's brief refers to a distinction between employees 
located in what they call the plant area as contrasted 
with general office employees, and further states that 
those employees within the plant were all represented 
by labor unions and therefore their terms of employment 
were dictated by negotiated contracts with the union. 
There was one group of salaried employees similar to 
general office employees, working in the plant area not 
represented by a labor union for whom a job evaluation 
program was completed and payments were made in 
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identically the same manner as payments were made to 
those who were represented by the unions. (E. 71) 
The second paragraph on Page 2 of the brief states 
that the job evaluation program was commenced as a 
result of an agreement with the CIO and various sub-
sidiaries of the United States Steel Co. Exhibit P- l and 
Exhibit P-14, Page 33, as published in the United Steel 
News, the official publication of the defendant company, 
states that the job evaluation or inequity study was 
ordered by the National War Labor Board in November, 
1944. The job evaluation program as discussed in said 
exhibits was established to accomplish the following: 
" 1 . Describe simply and concisely the content of each job 
in the bargaining unit; 2. Place the jobs in their proper 
relationship; 3. Reduce the job classifications to the 
smallest practical number by grouping those jobs having 
substantially equal content; and 4. Eastablish appro-
priate rates and methods of pay for the job as grouped 
within their respective job classifications." As explained 
in Exhibit P-l the program in addition to the above 
mentioned objectives was set up to eliminate inequities in 
pay scales between positions within the same subsidiary 
wherein the position called for comparable skill and 
training, and also to eliminate inequities as between sub-
sidiaries where the position required employees to do 
substantially the same or comparable work. How the 
program was to be conducted and carried out is explained 
in detail in said exhibits. 
The program at the Geneva Plant was first com-
pleted as to the wage and hourly workers in the mill and 
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thereafter was applied to two groups of salaried 
employees in the mill; one group represented by a bar-
gaining unit and the other group of salaried personnel 
not represented by a bargaining unit. Thereafter the 
program was conducted as to the salaried employees in 
the general office. (E. 66-68) There was only one dif-
ference in the general operation of the program as it 
applied to the four groups of employees. According to 
the Appellant, general office employees were required to 
be on the payroll on the effective date of the program. 
As to the other three groups of employees this require-
ment was not specified and upon application the 
employees would receive their retroactive pay even if 
they had terminated their employment with the com-
pany. (E. 72) 
The contention of the Eespondent was that there 
had been a usual practice and custom to grant to non-
union employees the same or comparable pay benefits 
at or near the same time as benefits were awarded to 
union employees. Two regular salary incerases were so 
received by the Eespondent during his course of employ-
ment until the date of July 16, 1948. (E, 51) At that 
time in announcing a pay increase, mention was made 
of the job evaluation program to be applied to non-
exempt salaried personnel comparable to the program 
commenced for the wage and hourly employees. (Ex. P-3) 
No further increase of a general nature was granted to 
any group of employees until December 1, 1950 (E, 136), 
approximately two and one/half years after the 
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announcement in July, 1948. It was the Respondent's 
contention that based upon the custom and implications 
of the job evaluation program the employees were led to 
believe and to rely upon the assertions that retroactive 
pay would be made to them at the completion of the 
evaluation program. 
Since the first point relied upon by the Appellant 
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
verdict of the jury and the judgment entered thereon, a 
more detailed examination of the evidence in support of 
the Respondent's claim will be made in the argument. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT ONE 
There is substantial competent evidence of an implied 
contract to the effect that the Appellant would pay to 
Respondent retroactive pay as determined by the job evalu-
ation program. 
POINT TWO 
The court did not err in admitting evidence of acts by 
the company subsequent to November, 1950, nor did the 
court err in giving instruction No. 10 pertaining to evidence 
of acts of the employer subsequent to November, 1950, at 
which time plaintiff's employment had ceased. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
There is substantial competent evidence of an implied 
contract to the effect that the Appellant would pay to 
Respondent retroactive pay as determined by the job evalu-
ation program. 
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Although the Appellant recognized the elementary 
rule that in an appeal from a jury's verdict the evidence 
must be reviewed in the light most favorable to the 
Respondent, Appellant thereafter proceeds to review and 
emphasize the evidence most favorable to the Appellant. 
I t is therefore respectfully submitted that the evidence 
most favorable to the Respondent is as follows: 
The first witness called by the Respondent was 
James L. Dillon, Superintendent of Industrial Relations 
for the Appellant during the time in question. (R. 59) 
He testified that he had been with the Appellant and its 
predecessor Corporate Organization since the inception 
of its operations as a steel plant in the State of Utah. 
(R. 60) In connection with general pay increases to 
union and non-union employees Mr. Dillon testified as 
follows: 
"Q. You were then with the plant almost from 
the time of its inception ? 
A. From the time it started operations. 
Q. From the time it started operations, and dur-
ing that period of time were pay increases 
given—put that, were general pay increases 
granted Union employees, and non-Union 
employees at or near the same time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were those pay increases, although not actu-
ally the same, were they comparable, and cor-
responding anywhere near to the pay in-
creases granted Union Employees! 
A. Yes. 
Q. Has it been the policy of the Company, 
through the period of time that you were 
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there, to grant general increases, and we have 
discussed both as to time and comparable in 
amount, to employees, whether they were in 
Unions, or not in Unions? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you remeber, or know, of any instance 
when that policy or procedure was not fol-
lowed? 
A. No, I don't recall any particular instance 
where it was not followed." (R. 60-61) 
Mr. F. Ray Priedley, who had been with the Appel-
lant and the predecessor companies since the commence-
ment of operations in 1944, was Assistant Comptroller 
until June 30, 1950 and thereafter was the comptroller 
of the Appellant was called as a witness. Mr. Friedley, 
as chairman of the salary administration committee, 
which committee had the direct supervision and juris-
diction over the job evaluation program, testified con-
cerning the custom of the company as it applied to pay 
increases for union and non-union employees as follows: 
"Q. Now, during the period of time that you were 
there, had the company usually granted pay 
increases or pay benefits—by that, I mean 
general increases to non-union employees on 
the same basis, or a comparable basis of time 
and percentage, as they had to union 
employees? 
A. So far as the dates are concerned, that is cor-
rect, so far as the rates of pay or general 
increases are concerned, they would differ, 
of course. 
Q. They will differ in exact amounts to any one 
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employee, but the general, all-over increase 
was just about the same, was it not? 
A. Well, general increases being related usually 
to cost of living increases, yes, the treatment 
would be similar. 
Q. Has that been true of all of the time you have 
been working with that company? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Do you know of any instance where that did 
not generally follow? 
A. Now, you are referring to general increases, 
of course? 
Q. Yes, general increases? 
A. Again, I will state, so far as the dates are 
concerned, I know of no exceptions to that, 
and so far as my statement on amount, there 
would be no exception to that." (R. 97, 98) 
Mr. Torvall Nelson, an employee of the Appellant 
in the engineering department and classified as a general 
office employee, commenced working for the company on 
December 2,1946 and was still working with the company 
at the time of trial, testified as to a general custom as 
follows: 
"Q. During that period of time up to the present 
time, would you say there is a policy, general 
procedure or custom in respect to making 
general pay increases? Answer "yes" or 
unn" ***** 
A. Yes. 
Q. I used a lot of terms, custom, policy, pro-
cedure, what would you call it in your own 
words, the plan we are talking about? 
A. I would say it was customary. 
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Q. Well, what is customary ? 
A. For instance, the hourly people would receive 
a blanket increase, sometime following that, 
maybe two or three weeks, by the general 
office personnel would receive an increase 
somewhat similar to it. 
Q. Would it usually be effective as to the same 
date, the hourly increase was granted, and 
announced late on ? 
A. Usually earlier. 
Q. The amount received, how would you describe 
that? 
A. Similar. 
Q. Has that always been the case? 
A. Since I came to work there, it always has 
been more or less an established procedure." 
(R. 126) 
Alton Sumsion, an employee in identically the same 
department in which the Respondent worked, was called 
as a witness and testified concerning the custom of the 
Appellant in connection with pay increases as follows: 
"A. Usually, or as far as I know always when a 
bargaining unit has negotiated an increase, 
a similar increase has also been extended to 
the salaried people. 
Q. That is true to all types of pay benefits, is 
that right? 
A. That is right. 
Q. Did you receive your retroactive pay for that 
period of time ? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And did you report that as wages earned, did 
you? 
A. Yes." (R. 132) 
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The Respondent likewise testified as to the existence 
of the custom mentioned above. (R. 126) 
The Respondent commenced working for the Appel-
lant or predecessor on January 20, 1947 (R. 136) and 
thereafter received a general increase as did all of the 
employees whether union or non-union on April 1, 1947 
and July 16, 1948. (R. 51) Thereafter the Respondent 
did not receive any general pay increase from said date 
in July, 1948 up until the time of terminiation on Novem-
ber 30,1950. (R. 136) 
In connection with the pay increase made effective 
July 16, 1948, an announcement was made as follows: 
"Nonexempt Salaried Personnel 
All salaried employees classified as non-
exempt under the provisions of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act and members of plant personnel 
shall receive a salary increase effective July 16, 
1948, amounting to $17.00 per month, represent-
ing the monthly equivalent of 9%^ minimum 
hourly rate increase granted wage earners. A 
salary rate inequities program will be undertaken 
with respect to said nonexempt salaried positions 
comparable to the inequities program recently 
completed for wage earners. An increase incre-
ments cost comparable to that granted wage 
earners will be reserved for distribution through 
retroactivity of the salary rate inequities program 
for the period commencing July 16, 1948." (Ex. 
P-3) (Emphasis added). 
Although the Appellant does not challegen the fact 
that the Respondent was a non-exempt salaried person-
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nel, it contends that this notice did not apply to the 
Respondent since it was addressed to all plant depart-
ment heads. Attention is called to the notice which states, 
"All salaried employees * * * and plant personnel * * *". 
If the notice was only to apply to employees in the plant 
it would seem unnecessary to make the distinction cited 
above. The reference to plant personnel cannot be con-
strued as applying to non-salaried employees, since the 
notice announces the salary increases as being the 
equivalent of 91/2^ minimum hourly rate increase granted 
to wage earners. Both the Eespondent and the witness 
Torvall Nelson, who worked in the general office in the 
engineering department, testified that they had seen the 
announcement and, since they were non-exempt salaried 
personnel, understood the announcement as applyig to 
them. (B. 128) That such a program was discussed in 
1948 and 1949 as to general office employees was verified 
by Mr. Dillon, Superintendent of Industrial Relations. 
(R, 77) The purported distinction between the plant and 
general offices will be further discussed in argument of 
the next point. 
The announcement of the pay increase and the job 
evaluation program contained in the letter of August 3, 
1948 referred to the job evaluation program which had 
been completed as to wage and hourly mill employees. 
(Ex. P-3) On June 25, 1948 a joint news release was 
made to the public press which stated that back pay to 
mill employees at the Geneva Plant would be paid in the 
near future and that the retroactive date was determined 
as March 9, 1947. (Ex. P-2) 
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Mr. Dillon testified that the first activity in con-
nection with the job classification program was com-
menced as it applied to the Geneva Plant in 1947 and was 
made effective on April 18, 1948. (R. 66) Thereafter a 
similar program was commenced as to salaried employees 
in the mill in the fall of 1948 but that this program was 
discontinued temporarily when some of the employees in 
that classification affiliated themselves with a bargain-
ing unit or labor union. However, the program was car-
ried on after the employees were unionized and was 
finally made effective November 19, 1950. (R. 66-67) 
The program as it applied to general office employees 
commenced in September, 1950; the job classifications 
were approved and completed in March, 1951; and the 
program was put into effect on June 3, 1951. (R. 50, 69) 
It was explained that there were only so many industrial 
engineers who could work and complete the pob descrip-
tions and thereafter the accounting department had to 
compute the retroactive pay based upon the new job 
classifications, and due to limited help only one program 
could be carried on at a time. 
In July, 1950 an announcement was made in the 
Provo Herald that clerical workers at Geneva would have 
placed in effect as to their positions a program similar 
to the one which had previously been applied to the 
hourly workers positions. (Ex. P-4) In the July, 1950 
issue of the United States Steel News reference was made 
to the job inequity program as it was initiated in 1944 
pursuant to a directive of the National War Labor Board 
which defined in detail the purpose and mechanics of 
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the program and further stated, "other employees will 
receive increases, part of which are amounts set aside 
and not heretofore paid to them when general wage 
increases were negotiated in 1948." (Ex. P-14 Page 33) 
It will be recalled that in the letter dated August 3, 1948 
after announcing the inequity program it stated an 
"increased increments cost comparable to that granted to 
wage earners will be reserved for distribution through 
retroactivity of the salary rate inequities program for 
the period commencing July 16,1948." (Ex. P-3) 
The Respondent some time prior to October 17, 
1950 was asked to prepare a job description of the par-
ticular position which he held. (R. 142-143) Thereafter 
a copy of the job description as prepared by the indus-
tria engineers was submitted to the Respondent for his 
approval. The Respondent testified that the initials ERR 
in the upper right hand corner on Exhibit P-9 are his 
initials placed there by him. (R. 142) On November 27, 
1950 the final approved job description was prepared. 
(Ex. P-10) 
x\s stated in the Appellant's brief and at the time of 
pre-trial and as urged before the jury at the time of trial, 
it was their contention that the company policy required 
that an employee to be elgible for retroactive pay in the 
general office had to be on the payroll on the effective 
date of the evaluation plan. (R. 72) It will be noted that 
as to all other employees, union or non-union, and even 
as to non-exempt salaried employees not represented by 
the union in the mill, retroactive payments were made 
whether said employees were on the payroll on the effec-
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tive date or not. (R. 72) In support of this contention the 
Appellant introduced Exhibits D-15 and D-16 being let-
ters to the various department heads advising them that 
as to non-exempt salaried employees a general increase 
was being granted and that a job evaluation program 
was under way which provided for retroactive pay back 
to March 9, 1947 and which further provided that it 
would apply only to employees on the payroll. It should 
be noted that this letter is dated December 15, 1950, two 
weeks after the Respondent had left the employment of 
the Company. It is the Respondent's contention that an 
implied in fact contract, based upon the prior custom and 
upon the publications and notice of the job evaluation 
program, had been formed by his continuing to work 
since August 3, 1948 with knowledge of such custom and 
publications, and that the contract could not subsequently 
be modified by the unilateral action of the company by 
specifying an additional requirement not heretofore 
involved in connection with the prior three reclassifica-
tion programs. The letters announcing such a require-
ment were intended to be a statement of an interum policy 
policy and were superceded when the policy and pro-
cedural mannual was finally issued which defined in 
particular the "former employees" who would be entitled 
to receive pay. (R. 112) The Policy and Procedural 
Manual, Exhibit P-12, issued June 1, 1951, effective June 
3, 1953, paragraph 6 entitled "Lump Sum Payments" for 
the retroactive period provided as follows: 
"Lump Sum Payments for the Retroactive Period. 
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6.1 For the purpose of Paragraph 6.3 below, 
the term "employee' shall mean an employee on 
the payroll of the Company, or an affiliated Con-
tract Company of United States Steel Company, 
on the date the standard salary scale becomes 
effective who since March 9, 1947, worked on a 
job covered by this Policy. A "qualified former 
employee" as determined by the Salary Adminis-
tration Committee, shall be eligible for retro-
active lump sum adjustments who: (a) since 
March 9, 1947, worked on a job or jobs covered 
by this policy; but (b) is not on the payroll of 
the Company or an affiliated Contract Company 
of United States Steel Company on the date the 
standard salary scale becomes effective; and (c) 
files individually signed request for individual 
lump sum payment in writing with the Company 
on or before August 17,1951." 
It will be noted that no place in this requirement is 
it stated that to be a "qualified former employee" the 
applicant must be on the payroll on the effective date. 
The very term being defined "qualified former employee" 
and caluse (b) indicates that the applicant would not be 
on the payroll on the effective date. It was further testi-
fied that the policy procedural manual adopted by the 
Geneva Steel Company was patterned after a policy 
procedural manual of the United States Steel Corpora-
tion of Delaware and that manual was used as a guide 
for the adoption of the manual for Geneva Steel. (B, 86) 
The same numbered paragraph on the same subject mat-
ter from the policy procedural manual of the Delaware 
corporation states as follows: 
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«##***an(j ^ e ^ e r m ^qUaiifieci former employee" 
shall be understood to mean an individual (except 
an individual who quit or was discharged) who: 
(a)" (emphasis added). 
Thereafter comparable provisions to the (a), (b), and 
(c) requirements contained in the Geneva Procedural 
Manual are set out. It is obvious that the manual of the 
Delaware Corporation specifies the requirement asserted 
by Appellant. But it is equally obvious that the salary 
administration committee at Geneva in adopting the pro-
visions for their own manual excluded that provision 
from the manual. It was the Respondent's contention 
therefore that the company did not intend to prohibit 
former employees from receiving their retroactive pay. 
To further show that it was the company's intention to 
treat non-exempt salaried employees either in the general 
offices or in the mill as well as union employees on 
identically the same terms, the Respondent submitted 
Exhibit P-7 being a news -release from Mr. L. J. West-
haver, Geneva Vice-President and Manager of Opera-
tions wherein he announced that salaried clerical and 
technical employees of the Geneva Steel Company who 
worked in plant areas other than the headquarters offices 
would receive their checks for retroactive salary pay-
ments, and then he stated: 
"similar retroactive payments are to be made at 
some future date for similar workers in the head-
quarters offices of the plant." 
Exhibit P-5, a notice placed on the bulletin boards, after 
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announcing retroactive pay for salaried employees repre-
sented by the union, both as to employees on the payrolls 
and for employees who had terminated their employment 
stated: 
4
 Salary rates and retroactive pay of non-
exempt salaried employees of the Geneva Plant 
not subject to the bargaining unit will be estab-
lished and computed in the same manner." 
(emphasis added) 
Exhibit P - l l is a worksheet prepared by Geneva 
Steel Company entitled "Salary Inequities" which sets 
forth the respective weekly pay periods in which the 
Respondent worked for the Appellant and shows the rate 
of pay which he was paid and the rate of pay which the 
position under the new classification should have been 
paid for the particular period of time. I t is from this 
exhibit and computation sheet that it was calculated that 
the Respondent if he were entitled to the retroactive pay 
would have received the sum of $1,574.17. I t is obvious 
from this computation as well as from the fact that it 
is classified as wages and pro-rated during the respective 
years for tax purposes that the computations were made 
on the basis of wages earned and that the amount paid 
was not a mere gratuity as often contended by the Appel-
lant. 
In Powell et al v. Republic Creosoting Co., 19 Pac. 
2d 919, 172 Wash. 155, the Respondent sued the Defend-
ant company for an additional amount owing for services 
rendered. It appeared that the Respondent had been an 
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employee of the defendant company for a period of years 
and during that period of time he had received, in addi-
tion to his base salary, a substantial bonus averaging an 
amount from 25% to as high as 63% of his stated salary. 
The Respondent resigned his position on December 1, 
1930 and was suing to recover a proportionate share of 
a bonus comparable to an amount paid the preceding 
year. 
The Respondent contended, and the trial court held, 
in effect that the course of dealings was sufficient to 
constitute an implied contract between the Respondent 
and the Appellant that the Respondent should be com-
pensated in addition to his regular salary by an adjust-
ment at the end of each year. The court in affirming the 
judgment stated as follows: 
"It does not necessarily follow that the total 
compensation earned by the respondent in 1930 
must equal or exceed the total in 1929, because 
.'.?; results were a factor to be taken into considera-
tion each year in determining the value of 
respondent's services. The appellant might have 
pleaded and proved, if such were the fact, that 
respondent's services resulted in less profit to 
the company in the last year, or even that the 
profits of the company fell off without fault on 
the part of any one, thus making the business as 
a whole less prosperous, less able to pay, less 
profitable to its stockholders and all concerned, 
and of course the services of every one connected 
with it would under those conditions be less valu-
able than in the years of prosperity. Nothing of 
this kind was even suggested in the pleadings or 
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hinted at in the testimony. On the contrary, it 
was shown that other branch managers received 
larger bonuses in the year 1930 than they did in 
the year 1929. 
"Respondent relies upon the case of Scott v. 
J . F . Duthie & Co. 125 Wash. 470, 216 P. 853, 28 
A. L. R. 328, and similar authorities. Appellant 
argues that these cases are based upon express 
contracts and are therefore not applicable here. 
We are not advised that implied contracts differ 
in any degree from express contracts in the re-
quirements as to mutuality and consideration. 
Here, as in the Scott Case, we can find both mu-
tuality and a sufficient consideration to support 
the contract 
"As early as 1919, by conduct which was there-
after continued, the employer began to hold out 
to the employee the offer or implied promise that, 
if he would continue in the service (which he was 
not otherwise required to do), his compensation 
would be adjusted annually on a basis of reason-
able value. The employee accepted the offer by 
continuing in the service; hence there was mu-
tuality and a consideration moving to the em-
ployer just as in the Scott Case, supra. In dis-
cussing this question, it was there said: 'The 
promise here was therefore no "nudum pactum" 
on that theory, nor is it one on the theory that the 
promise was one for additional pay to be given 
one already under contract to do the very work for 
which the additional pay was promised. The argu-
ment that the appellant cannot recover the bonus 
for the reason that he was paid his regular salary 
while in the respondent's employ overlooks the 
very idea conveyed by the Avord "bonus", which 
is "an allowance in addition to what is * * * stipu-
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lated." Standard Dictionary. The complaint 
shows that the appellant was free to quit his work 
at any time, and therefore was under no obligation 
to do the thing which the respondent was seeking 
to accomplish by its offer. The compliance with 
the terms of the offer created a contract supple-
mentary to the contract of employment. By this 
supplementary contract the respondent agreed to 
reward the appellant for remaining in its employ 
and refraining "from accepting employment else-
where until this company shall complete the 
ships."' 
"We conclude, therefore, that the trial court 
did not err in holding that respondent was en-
titled to compensation in the year 1930 at the same 
rate as was received in the year 1929. 
"The judgment is affirmed." 
An Annotation entitled, "Requisites as to definite-
ness of agreement to pay employee share of profits" in 
18 A. L. R. 2d 211 states as follows: 
"The authorities make it clear that the ques-
tion of whether a profit-sharing agreement, un-
certain in that it fails to set forth the extent of 
the employee's share, is sufficiently definite to 
bind the employer is not susceptible to rule-of-
thumb solution. On the contrary, although the 
courts uniformly recite the rule that contracts 
must be definite, the compliance or noncompliance 
with this rule by an individual promise by an em-
ployer to share profits with his employee is most 
often, if not always, determined from a consider-
ation of all surrounding facts and circumstances. 
And the courts have shown a tendency to grant 
recovery, if that can possibly be done, to an em-
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ployee who has proved the making of the profit-
sharing promise and who has acted in reliance 
thereon. 
"Illustrative of the tendency mentioned above 
are the cases treated herein which the courts have 
held that the test of definiteness is met where an 
employer promises to pay his employee a share of 
profits from a particular enterprise, or a 'fair and 
equitable share' of profits, or up to, but not to 
exceed, a specified percentage of profits, as well 
as those in which by reference to the employer's 
earlier practices certainty has been found in the 
share to which the employee is entitled. It has 
also been suggested that an apparently indefinite 
profit-sharing agreement can be rendered suffi-
ciently definite by consideration of the agreement 
in light of custom applicable to the parties." 
One of the cases annotated in the above cited anno-
tation is Snyder v. Hershey Chocolate Co. (1916) 63 Pa. 
Super Ct. 528. In this case the company had been ac-
customed to paying the employees a share of its profits. 
In holding that the plaintiff could enforce payment of a 
share of the profits, the court states: 
"We may assume that the payment of the 
additional wages was dependent upon the success 
of the business and that there was no absolute 
promise to pay a definite sum contained in the 
letter above referred to. What amount was to be 
distributed was to be determined by the board of 
directors. It was certain that the workmen were 
to have a share in the profits, if any were made. 
This was the inducement to the men to continue 
in the company's employ. In other words, the 
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promise was that at the end of the year there 
would be some distribution of profits, if any were 
made, and after the company fixed the amount 
which was to be distributed, then that which was 
indefinite became definite and all the laborers 
employed by the company who had taken employ-
ment under the promises to share if they contin-
ued to work during the year, were entitled to re-
ceive their extra compensation fixed at 20 per 
cent of their wages during the year. The company 
offered this as an inducement to the laborers to 
continue in its employ and this purpose being con-
summated by a fixing of the amount of the extra 
compensation, all the elements of a valid contract 
were present." 
The Appellant in the present case should not be 
heard to complain that the contract cannot be enforced 
because of indefiniteness. The Respondent maintained 
that there was a definite contract to pay him retroactive 
pay when the job classification program was completed 
in such amount as the classification would determine 
should be paid for the position which he held. He does 
not now challenge the computation of this amount as 
contained in Exhibit P-ll. It is assumed that the in-
dustrial engineers acted in good faith in arriving at the 
classification assig;ned to the position held by Respond-
ent. The fact that the amount which would be paid Re-
spondent could not be ascertained at the time of the for-
mation of the contract does not invalidate the contract 
if the procedure to be followed is sufficiently detailed 
and after the classification has been made the amount 
then can be readily ascertained. Exhibit P-l, being ex-
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cerpts from the publication of United States Steel News, 
states six steps which shall be followed and explains in 
detail how the reclassification program will be conducted. 
The respondent, according to his contract, could only 
insist that the program be followed in good faith as out-
lined. If as a result of the reclassification, it developed 
that the position he held was being overpaid, he could not 
complain. On the other hand, if it developed that the 
position he held should have been paid an additional 
amount, he was entitled to receive retroactive pay com-
pensating him for this differential. The contract was 
definite from the beginning; the amount became definite 
after the completion of the program. The Respondent 
has never challenged or contested the amount as com-
puted in Exhibit P-ll by employees of the Appellant. 
In an annotation entitled, "Right of employee to 
bonus as affected by termination of employment before 
bonus becomes payable", in 28 A. L. R. 346 it is stated 
as follows: 
uIn the absence of special considerations, it 
seems reasonable to hold, as several of the cases 
cited below do hold, that assuming that there is a 
valid and enforceable promise through the offer 
of a bonus and acceptance by the employee's con-
tinuing in the service, if the employment is termi-
nated by mutual consent of the parties or by the 
act of the employer through no fault of the em-
ployee, the latter should be entitled to a propor-
tionate share of the bonus, according to the time 
served, even though there was no time fixed for 
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the duration of the employment, and it could, 
therefore, be terminated at will." 
In this case the Respondent worked for the Appellant 
the entire period for which retroactive pay was to be paid, 
namely from March 9, 1947 to December 1, 1950. There 
was no attempt to impose a time limitation with which the 
Respondent must comply to be entitled to the retroactive 
pay until after the expiration of this period. More par-
ticularly, December 15, 1950 (Ex. D-15 and 16) was the 
first time any mention was made that an employee to be 
eligible for retroactive pay would have to be on the pay-
roll on the effective date of the new classification. As 
contended by the Appellant, to which the Respondent 
could not object, and as the court instructed the jury, 
no fact or circumstance after December 1 could be con-
sidered in connection with the formation of the contract 
or the terms thereof,, 
The only case cited by the Appellant in support of 
their position is the case of Pyeatt v. El Paso Natural 
Gas Company (N. Mex. 1950) 213 Pac. 2d 436. This case 
merely affirmed the trial court's holding that under the 
facts there presented there had been no reliance upon the 
offer made by the company. More particularly, the court 
stated that the employee had not continued working for 
the company in anticipation of any wage increase, but 
rather that the employee had purchased a farm and it 
was his intention to only remain with the company until 
such time as it was necessary for him to operate the farm 
the following year. The offer to the employees was a con-
ditional offer only, to the effect that they would receive a 
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pay increase if approved by the War Labor Board. The 
condition was not performed until after the employees 
had terminated their employment with the company. The 
most that can be said about this case is that it affirmed 
the holding of the trial court which had made an adverse 
decision on the facts to the employees there involved. 
The rule there established should likewise be followed in 
this case and the finding of the jury should now be af-
firmed. 
In an annotation in 100 A. L. R. 969 at 985 the gen-
eral rule, without citation of dissenting authority, is 
stated as follows: 
"Where the existence of a contract is to be 
made out, if at all, from evidence of the acts of the 
parties and surrounding circumstances, as con-
strued in connection with informal writings, and 
where, from such acts and circumstances opposite 
inference may be drawn as to the existence of 
some fact essential to the contract, a jury question 
is presented." 
It is respectfully submitted that the court properly 
permitted the jury to determine whether the facts and 
circumstances in this particular case were sufficient to 
establish an implied contract between the parties. The 
jury having determined this factual issue in favor of the 
Respondent, it is manifest from the testimony in the 
above-entitled action that there was more than sufficient 
competent evidence to justify the determination of the 
jury. 
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;
 POINT TWO 
The court did not err in admitting evidence of acts by 
the company subsequent to November, 1950, nor did the 
court err in giving instruction No. 10 pertaining to evidence 
of acts of the employer subsequent to November, 1950, at 
which time plaintiff's employment had ceased. 
The Appellant in Points Two and Three urges that 
the court erred in admitting certain exhibits and evidence 
of facts and circumstances which occurred after Decem-
ber 1, 1950. Such evidence was stated to be Exhibits P 
7-13 inclusive. The record discloses that the Appellant 
only objected to the introduction of one of these exhibits. 
As to Exhibit 8, a letter of April 2, 1951 to the govern-
ment requesting authority to adopt the retroactive plan, 
no objection was made to the admissibility of that docu-
ment, (R. 94) In fact, the Appellant relied upon the lan-
guage contained in the document in support of its con-
tention. (R. 114) Nor was any objection made to the in-
troduction of Exhibit P-9 (R, 143), Exhibit P-10 (R. 94), 
Exhibit 12 and 13 (R. 96) and apparently Exhibit P-l l 
was received by stipulation. (R. 61) Furthermore Ex-
hibit P-9 was dated October 17, 1950 and was a copy of 
a job description submitted to the Respondent for his 
approval while he was working for the company. Ex-
hibit 10 was dated November 27, 1950, also during the 
term of the employment of the Respondent. If the other 
exhibits dated after December 1, 1950 are immaterial, 
then so are the Appellant's exhibits D-15 and D-16, both 
dated December 15, 1950. These exhibits are the letters 
upon which the Appellant rests in defense that em-
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ployees had to be on the payroll on the effective date of 
the program in order to receive retroactive pay. 
Only one of the exhibits specified in the argument 
of this point was objected to and that was Exhibit P-7 
and part of the objection to that exhibit was that it was 
irrelevant and immaterial since it did not apply to the 
general office except as follows: "Similar retroactive 
payments are to be made at some future date for similar 
workers in the headquarters officers of the plant," This 
statement was also claimed to be immaterial since it was 
stated by counsel for Appellant that there was no issue 
concerning the same. If there had been no issue as 
claimed by the Appellant on this question, the matter 
might have been irrelevant and immaterial, but the very 
claim of the Appellant that the Respondent had to be an 
employee on the payroll on the effective date shows that 
a similar program was not being applied to the general 
office employees since that requirement had not been 
specified as to any other group of employees. I t was the 
Respondent's contention that this document was material 
to aid in the construction of the requirements placed in 
the policy procedural manual relied upon by the Appel-
lant and to show by the company's own construction it 
was its intention to apply identically the same program 
to the general office employees. The other part of the 
Objection made to this one exhibit was that it occurred 
more than four months after the plaintiff had quit. The 
court to guard against any possible assertion that this 
document could be used as part of the foundation for an 
offer made to the Respondent instructed the jury in In-
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struction No. 10 as follows: "You are instructed that in 
determining whether defendant made an offer to plaintiff 
to make a retroactive adjustment you are not to consider 
any statement or act* made or done after December 1, 
1950; * * *" 
The Appellant on appeal objects for the first time 
to the introduction of Exhibit P-8, a letter which it relied 
upon as specifying the requirement that the employee 
had to be on the payroll. The Kespondent introduced this 
document to identify Exhibit P-5 which was a notice 
placed upon the bulletin boards for the employees of the 
company to inspect. This notice announced the comple-
tion of the program as to salary workers in the mill and 
specified that retroactive payments would be made to 
March 9, 1947. The notice further specified that former 
employees would receive their retroactive pay and then 
stated, "Salary rates and retroactive pay of non-exempt 
salaried employees of the Geneva Plant not subject to the 
bargaining unit will be established and computed in the 
same manner." It will be noted that this paragraph says 
at the Geneva Plant. A pencil indication on the bottom of 
said notice states, "Posted in each plant on bulletin board 
for a period of one week commencing on or about Decem-
ber 1, 1950." As has been previously stated the Appel-
lant takes the position that when referring to the Geneva 
Plant they are talking about the operations inside of the 
fence and not the general offices. However, in its letter 
to the government dated April 2, 1951, Exhibit P-8, it is 
stated that a retroactive pay program had been com-
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pleted for non-exempt salaried personnel at the Geneva 
and Ironton Plants and that as par t of the overall pro-
gram, 
"it was our intention to apply a similar inequity 
study to the non-exempt personnel who are within 
the general office group, which would include also 
non-exempt salaried personnel at the quarry and 
the coal mines." 
"A notice was posted on or about December 
1, 1950 throughout the general locations in which 
these groups of employees are working advising 
them that such a program would be inaugurated 
and placed into effect at the earliest possible time, 
a copy of this notice is attached." 
I t was admitted that Exhibit P-5 was the notice re-
ferred to in the letter of April 2, 1951 and by the terms 
of that letter it distinctly states that this notice was placed 
on the bulletin boards where it could be observed by em-
ployees in the general office group. It is therefore ob-
vious that the company as well as employees have used 
and understood the term "Geneva Plant" to refer to the 
entire operations located at what is known as Geneva, 
Utah or the steel plant in Utah County. 
Exhibit P-7, the only exhibit of the above group 
which Appellant objected to at the trial, is material to 
rebutt this alleged distinction. In this Exhibit Mr. L. J. 
Westhaver is quoted as follows: "He said similar retro-
active payments are to be made at some future date for 
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similar workers in the headquarters offices of the plant" 
(italics added) 
Since the Appellant at the trial stated there was no 
objection to the introduction of the fore-mentioned ex-
hibits, except as to Exhibit P-7; since Exhibit P-7 was 
admissible for independent reasons not connected with 
the making of an offer by the company; and since the 
court instructed the jury not to consider any statement or 
act made or done after December 1, 1950 in determining 
if an offer had been made, the Appellant cannot con-
scientiously maintain that the court erred in this regard. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant may feel that it is proper to attempt 
to deny the claim of the Respondent even though it must 
recognize that the Respondent did not receive a general 
pay raise for a period of approximately 2 and % years 
while the job evaluation program was being conducted 
and even though it has received the benefit of the em-
ployee's labor during that period of time. The Appellant 
may also feel that it is proper to belittle the claim of 
the Respondent and to flippantly treat it and classify it 
as was done in their brief as, "confusion, confusion, con-
fusion." Mr. Heald, executive secretary of the company 
and associate general counsel, stated, "it was our de-
termination that the company would receive the most 
benefit from such a program by applying the program 
to employees of the company, not former employees of 
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the company, those gentlemen were gone and presum-
ably had left the company for reasons sufficient for 
themselves." Considering the long period of time from 
July 16, 1948, when the program was announced, to June 
3, 1951, when the program was made effective, and the 
number of employees who had terminated employment 
with the company, it can readily be seen how "the com-
pany would receive the most benefit" from attempting 
to cut off retroactive pay to such employees. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Respondent was 
justified in relying upon the custom acknowledged by 
the head officers of the company to the effect that all 
employees would receive comparable pay benefits. He 
was justified in believing that as soon as time would per-
mit, the classification program would be applied to the 
general office employees. All communications indicated 
that the program would be identical. It was common 
knowledge that the program was being carried out. Not 
until December 15, was any communication made which 
would indicate that there would be a new and different 
requirement which would be applied to general office em-
ployees. At this time it is submitted the contract had been 
formed and could not be unilaterally modified. I t is fur-
ther submitted that when the company finally adopted 
the plan and put it into effect on June 3, 1951, as speci-
fied in the Policy Procedural Manual, it specifically de-
leted any such requirement by not following either ver-
batim or in substance the guide as set out in the Policy 
Procedural Manual of the Delaware corporation, which 
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included such a requirement. It is therefore respectfully 
submitted that, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Eespondent, the verdict of the jury and 
the judgment entered thereon should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAN S. BUSHNELL, 
Attorney for Respondent. 
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